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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






MICHAEL A. ROMERO, 




ABU AHSAN, in their individual and official capacities;  
 ROBIN GEHRMANN, in their individual and official capacities  
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:13-cv-07695) 
District Judge:  Honorable Freda L. Wolfson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 24, 2020 
Before:  AMBRO, GREENAWAY, Jr., and PORTER, Circuit Judges 
 







 Michael A. Romero, who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from 
an order of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey granting the 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this civil rights case.  For the reasons set 
forth below, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment in part, vacate in part, and 
remand for further proceedings.   
I. 
 On December 28, 2011, Romero, a state prisoner, suffered an injury to his right 
knee while playing basketball.  Immediately after the injury occurred, Dr. Abu Ahsan, the 
medical director at the New Jersey State Prison, prescribed Tylenol with codeine and 
crutches.  Dr. Ahsan also admitted Romero to the infirmary for an X-ray, the results of 
which were normal.  On January 3, 2012, Dr. Ahsan ordered that Romero continue to 
receive infirmary care, that he be provided with a knee immobilizer, and that he perform 
range-of-motion exercises and engage in weight bearing as tolerated.  Dr. Ahsan also 
ordered an expedited MRI test.  Dr. Ahsan saw Romero again on January 4 and 6; on 
both occasions, Romero noted that his knee was better but that he still could not put 
weight on it.  When Romero complained on January 9 that he was experiencing pain at 
night, Dr. Ahsan prescribed another two-week course of Tylenol with codeine, two times 
per day.  Following the MRI test, and after consulting with an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. 
Ahsan proposed a treatment plan on January 12, 2012, that included a knee immobilizer 
for two weeks, to be followed by a hinged knee brace for three months, and then eventual 
surgery to repair the ACL.  Romero was fitted with the knee immobilizer on January 18.    
Next, Romero had an orthopedic consultation with Dr. Ahmar Shakir, who 
recommended surgery and stated that Romero should be treated at a tertiary care center.  
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In mid-February, Romero was examined by Dr. Robin Gehrmann, who “recommended a 
hinged knee brace, range-of-motion exercises, and six weeks of physical therapy.”  (SA 
38.)  “Romero ‘understood that he needed to strengthen his right knee before undergoing 
surgery’ and ‘did not object to the proposed plan of treatment.’”  (Id. (quoting ECF No. 
58-2 ¶ 30).)  On February 15, Dr. Ahsan ordered a hinged knee brace.  While waiting for 
the hinged knee brace, Romero continued to take Tylenol with codeine.  He also began 
physical therapy on March 3.  Dr. Gehrmann examined Romero again on March 27.  At 
that appointment, Romero reported that he was not in as much pain, and Dr. Gehrmann 
noted that Romero’s range of motion had improved from the previous visit.  In notes 
from Romero’s medical visits during the period of February 15 to June 12, health care 
providers stated that Romero had not yet obtained a hinged knee brace.  Romero received 
the hinged knee brace on June 12, 2012.  On June 26, Dr. Gehrmann, noted “‘drastic’ 
improvement” in Romero’s range of motion.  (SA 39.)   
II. 
In December 2013, Romero filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
against Dr. Ahsan.1  In the complaint, Romero alleged that Dr. Ahsan deliberately 
delayed distribution of the hinged knee brace and denied knee surgery on account of 
grievances that Romero had filed against him.  Romero claimed that Dr. Ahsan’s conduct 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment and retaliation 
 
1  The complaint also named Dr. Gehrmann, but the parties eventually stipulated to 
the dismissal of Dr. Gehrmann from the case. 
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under the First Amendment.  He sought, among other things, a declaration that his 
constitutional rights were violated, an order enjoining further retaliation, and unspecified 
compensatory and punitive damages.    
The District Court granted Romero’s motion for appointment of counsel.  After 
the completion of discovery, Dr. Ahsan filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing 
that Romero failed to exhaust administrative remedies, that the evidence did not 
demonstrate either a serious medical condition or deliberate indifference to a serious 
medical need, and that Romero failed to demonstrate that he had engaged in 
constitutionally protected conduct or that Dr. Ahsan took any retaliatory act.   
Although the District Court concluded that Romero’s claims were not barred by a 
failure to exhaust,2 it ruled in favor of Dr. Ahsan on the merits of Romero’s claims.  In 
particular, with respect to the surgery-related portion of the inadequate-treatment claim, 
the District Court held that the evidence did not support a finding that the non-operative 
medical treatment Romero received was inadequate.  Furthermore, the District Court 
concluded that although there was a factual question regarding whether the delay in 
providing the hinged knee brace constituted inadequate treatment, there was no evidence 
demonstrating that the delay was intentional.  The District Court also rejected the 
retaliation claims.  According to the District Court, the evidence did not support a link 
between the delay in providing the hinged brace and the grievances filed against Dr. 
 
 2 Dr. Ahsan does not seek to defend the District Court’s judgment on the ground 
that Romero failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 
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Ahsan.  Finally, because the non-surgical treatment was consistent with the 
recommendations of the treating orthopedists, the District Court held that no reasonable 
factfinder could conclude that a person of ordinary firmness in Romero’s position would 
be deterred from exercising the First Amendment right to file grievances.  Romero filed a 
pro se notice of appeal.      
III. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise de novo review over the 
District Court’s order granting summary judgment.  See S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower 
Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 256 (3d Cir. 2013).  Summary judgment is proper when, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all 
inferences in favor of that party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); 
Kaucher v. Cty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422-23 (3d Cir. 2006).  If the moving party 
meets the initial burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue, the burden shifts to 
the nonmoving party to “come forward with specific facts” showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial.  See Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  We may affirm on any basis supported by the record.  See 






An incarcerated plaintiff asserting a § 1983 claim for inadequate medical care 
under the Eighth Amendment must show the existence of a serious medical need and that 
facility staff demonstrated deliberate indifference to that medical need.  See Pearson v. 
Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017).  As the District Court properly 
concluded, it is clear that Romero’s injury – involving a torn anterior cruciate ligament 
(ACL), meniscal tear, and other knee damage – constituted a serious medical condition 
that was “diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment.”  See Monmouth Cty. Corr. 
Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987).  Dr. Ahsan himself was one 
of several physicians who diagnosed Romero’s injury as requiring treatment. 
Accordingly, our inquiry focuses on whether it was error to determine that, as a 
matter of law, the record cannot support a finding that Dr. Ahsan acted with deliberate 
indifference to Romero’s injury.  Deliberate indifference can be shown by a prison 
official’s “intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally 
interfering with the treatment once prescribed.”  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 
(1976).  Allegations of medical malpractice are not sufficient to establish a constitutional 
violation.  White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 108-09 (3d Cir. 1990).  Furthermore, “mere 
disagreement as to the proper medical treatment” does not support a claim of an Eighth 
Amendment violation.  Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates, 834 F.2d at 346. 
We will first address the Eighth Amendment claim related to the almost four-
month-long delay in providing the hinged knee brace.  The District Court concluded that 
the evidence did leave “some question” as to the adequacy of care concerning the delay.  
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In particular, the District Court stated that the evidence did not explain why there was a 
lengthy delay in obtaining the hinged knee brace.  Nevertheless, the District Court 
rejected the claim because Romero’s “brief in opposition [did] not respond as to the 
alleged delay in receiving the knee brace at all, much less point to evidence showing that 
such delay was intentional, rather than merely inadvertent.”   
We have held that “extrinsic proof is not necessary for the jury to find deliberate 
indifference in a delay or denial of medical treatment claim.”  Pearson, 850 F.3d at 537.  
Instead, “[a]ll that is needed is for the surrounding circumstances to be sufficient to 
permit a reasonable jury to find that the delay or denial was motivated by non-medical 
factors.”  Id.  That standard has been met here.  Romero alleged in his complaint that 
“defendants deliberate[ly] delayed in providing a hinged knee brace to prolong plaintiff’s 
pain and suffering … because plaintiff filed grievances against them.”  See Compl. at ¶ 
29.  Further, Romero submitted a copy of a grievance dated May 20, 2012, which alleged 
that the hinged knee brace was being “maliciously delay[ed] . . . to keep [him] in the 
wheelchair and prolong [his] pain as punishment because [he] filed remedy forms.”  He 
also submitted a copy of a letter, dated February 17, 2012, to Ms. Kathy Trillo, Manager 
of the NJSP Medical Department, in which he noted that he had yet to be provided with 
the recommended hinged knee brace “because [he] filed remedy forms.”  Moreover, 
according to Romero, Dr. Ahsan told him on January 13, 2012, that “patients that file 
remedy forms do not receive surgeries in my prison.”  Approximately one month later, 
shortly after Dr. Gehrmann recommended non-operative treatment, Dr. Ahsan stated to 
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Romero, “I told you, complaining equals no surgery, you just learned a valuable lesson.”  
Although those statements did not specifically reference the hinged knee brace, they 
suggest that Romero’s grievances, not his medical needs, influenced Dr. Ahsan’s 
decisions.  Without the hinged knee brace, Romero asserted that he was confined to a 
wheelchair for the first six months following his injury.  After obtaining the brace, 
Romero’s knee significantly improved.  We conclude that this summary-judgment 
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to Romero, indicates that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the delay in obtaining the hinged knee 
brace was motivated by non-medical factors.   
The District Court did, however, properly grant summary judgment on Romero’s 
surgery-related inadequate medical care claim.  A prisoner’s medical treatment is 
presumed to be proper, “absent evidence that it violates professional standards of care.”  
Pearson, 850 F.3d at 535 (citation omitted).  To overcome that presumption, there must 
be evidence showing that the care violated professional norms.  Id. at 536.  Here, 
although both Dr. Ahsan and Dr. Shaker initially proposed surgery, Dr. Gehrmann, 
indicated that non-operative treatment was preferable.  Dr. Gehrmann’s conclusion was 
based in part on the “time frame since the injury” and the possibility that, without 
“specific rehab measures” that were unavailable in prison, Romero “could actually end 
up with worse outcomes if he had the surgery.”3  Romero argues that Dr. Ahsan should 
 
3 In May 2014, over four months after Romero commenced this action, Dr. Ahsan 
requested that Romero receive another orthopedic consultation because Romero had 
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have ordered the surgery.  But mere disagreement with the course of treatment does not 
create an actionable constitutional violation.  See Monmouth Cty. Corr. Institutional 
Inmates, 834 F.2d at 346.  And no actionable claim arises “when a doctor disagrees with 
the professional judgment of another doctor,” because “[t]here may … be several 
acceptable ways to treat an illness.”  White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 
1990) (emphasis in original).  Because Romero’s treatment reflects professional medical 
judgment that surgery was not appropriate, the District Court correctly entered summary 
judgment in favor of Dr. Ahsan on the Eighth Amendment claims. 
V. 
We conclude, moreover, that the District Court properly entered summary 
judgment on Romero’s First Amendment retaliation claim as to the denial of surgery.  “A 
prisoner alleging retaliation must show (1) constitutionally protected conduct, (2) an 
adverse action by prison officials sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from 
exercising his constitutional rights, and (3) a causal link between the exercise of his 
constitutional rights and the adverse action taken against him.  Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 
523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rauser v. Horn, 241 
F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001)).  Assuming that Romero made the requisite initial showing 
as to these factors,4 we nevertheless conclude that Dr. Ahsan has demonstrated that he 
 
reinjured his knee.  An orthopedist recommended that Romero be scheduled for knee 
surgery, which was performed in October 2014. 
 
4 Given this assumption, we do not address the District Court’s conclusion that, 
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would have denied surgery even if Romero had not filed grievances.  See Rauser, 241 
F.3d at 333-34 (stating that “once a prisoner demonstrates that his exercise of a 
constitutional right was a substantial or motivating factor in the challenged decision, the 
prison officials may still prevail by proving that they would have made the same decision 
absent the protected conduct for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate penological 
interest”).  As noted above, Dr. Gehrmann, the orthopedic specialist who would have 
performed the surgery, indicated that non-operative treatment was preferable.  Romero 
himself stated at his deposition that he did not object when told that the plan was to 
strengthen his knee through physical therapy before deciding whether to perform surgery.  
After Romero received physical therapy and obtained the hinged knee brace, his range of 
motion “improved drastically.”  Under these circumstances, and despite Dr. Ahsan’s 
statements tying the surgery decision to the grievances, we conclude that any reasonable 
factfinder would be compelled to find that this constellation of events meant that Romero 
would not have surgery at this time regardless of any statements made by Dr. Ahsan.  See 
Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016) (discussing “same decision 
defense”).   
But we will vacate the District Court’s entry of summary judgment on the 
retaliation claim, as it pertains to the delay in providing the hinged knee brace.  The 
 
because Romero “received ongoing medical treatment that was consistent with the 
recommendations of treating orthopedists,” a reasonable jury could not find that a person 
of ordinary firmness in Romero’s position who was denied surgery would have been 
deterred from an exercise of his constitutional rights.   
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District Court held that “Romero has introduced no evidence of any link between the 
delay and any intention by [Dr.] Ahsan to retaliate for grievance filings.”  This 
conclusion ignores portions of the summary judgment record that, as discussed above, 
suggest that Dr. Ashan deliberately disregarded Romero’s need for the hinged knee brace.  
Indeed, Romero alleged that Dr. Ahsan delayed providing the hinged knee brace because 
he filed grievances against Dr. Ahsan.  Comp’l, ¶ 37.  Moreover, those grievances – 
which were filed on January 6, 2012, January 13, 2012, and February 16, 2012 – 
generally coincided with the period during which the hinged knee brace had been 
prescribed but not provided.  See Watson, 834 F.3d 417, 424 (3d Cir. 2016) (stating that 
an inmate “can establish the third element of a prima facie case of retaliation with 
evidence of … an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity 
and the allegedly retaliatory action”).  Dr. Ahsan alleged that he had no knowledge of any 
grievance filed against him by Romero.  But disputed questions of material fact are not 
resolved on summary judgment; rather, the court must view all of the facts in the record 
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and rule, as a matter of law, based on 
those facts.  See Doe v. Indian River Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 256, 275 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).  
Applying that standard, we conclude that the District Court erred in entering summary 
judgment on Romero’s retaliation claim concerning the hinged knee brace.   
VI. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment in part and 
vacate in part and remand for further proceedings.  Specifically, we will affirm the 
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District Court’s rejection of Romero’s Eighth Amendment medical care claim and his 
First Amendment retaliation claim concerning the denial of surgery.  But we will vacate 
its disposition of the First and Eighth Amendment claims as they relate to the delay in 
providing the hinged knee brace.5 
 
 
5 Dr. Ahsan’s Motion to Seal Supplemental Appendix, Volume II, which contains 
Romero’s medical records, is granted, and that Appendix is sealed for 25 years. 
